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Overview of the Initiative


The Working Group's fastest product

- In April 2019, UNCITRAL member states suggested that the Secretariat prepare a draft Code of Conduct together with ICSID (parallel to ICSID rules revision)
- **Swift progress** of the initiative since then: first draft circulated in <u>November 2020</u> second revised draft circulated in <u>April 2021</u> third and current draft circulated in <u>September 2021</u>
- Comments provided by member states on each draft were implemented
- **Means of Implementation and Enforcement** proposed by Secretariat and ICSID in September; final version to be accompanied by official commentary
- Code of Conduct & Means of Implementation and Enforcement to be discussed at the Working Group session on November 15 to 19

The Code of Conduct in the Context of ISDS Reform

What it does & doesn't do:

- The Code addresses concerns relating to the conduct of adjudicators of international investment disputes
- Similar to existing voluntary standards like the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration
- Contributes little to overarching ISDS reform



General structure

- 11 articles & 1 annex → structure of previous drafts maintained; some articles renamed
 - Definitions of key terminology
 - Application of the Code
 - Substantive provisions
 - Rule on compliance
 - Annexed disclosure form for adjudicators
- Means of Implementation and Enforcement suggested in a separate document
- Refers to arbitrators and judges of a possible MIC jointly as "adjudicators" → drafted in an open-ended way to apply to ISDS and/or possible MIC

Definitions and scope

ARTICLE 1 - Definitions

- Narrow definition of adjudicator includes arbitrators (and MIC judges), excludes mediators, conciliators, fact finders, and staff of arbitral institutions;
- Frequent distinction between candidate and adjudicator clarifies duration of application
- Contract- and law-based disputes not covered
- **New definition of "Treaty Party"** clarifies distinction between disputing parties and State parties to the treaty; does not define state agencies, branches or entities at subnational level

ARTICLE 2 – Application of the Code

- No direct application to assistants application to be guaranteed by adjudicators
- Clarifies relationship with other Codes of Conduct two options: (1) no application if existing code, or (2) application unless otherwise modified by existing code

Independence and Impartiality

ARTICLE 3 – Independence and Impartiality


- Article 3(1): "Adjudicators shall be independent and impartial."
- Independence and impartiality are now framed as a standalone principle of article 3 reinforces central importance of concepts; independent of whom?
- Secretariat: difference between the two concepts to be further fleshed out in the Commentary with reference to the rule in <u>Suez v. Argentina</u>:

"[I]ndependence relates to the lack of relations with a party that might influence an arbitrator's decision. Impartiality, on the other hand, concerns the absence of a bias or predisposition toward one of the parties" (para 29)

Problematic issue: double (or multiple) hatting

ARTICLE 4 – Limit on Multiple Roles

- **Double hatting:** One individual acting as adjudicator & in at least one different role in separate proceedings <u>sequentially</u> or <u>simultaneously</u>; calls into question adjudicator's impartiality and independence
- 3 Options (1) full prohibition, (2) modified prohibition, and (3) full disclosure
- → Only outright ban addresses concerns
- → Proposals remain less detailed than IBA Guidelines



Witness, expert,

judge, secretary, etc.

Arbitrator in ISDS

proceeding 1

Ex parte communication

ARTICLE 7 – *Ex parte* communication

- General prohibition of *ex parte* communication, unless specified in the article
 - Exceptions for search for suitable candidates in pre-constitution phase and contrary agreements or rules
 - BUT: article does not specify which communication between disputing parties and candidates is permitted;
- Broad definition covering candidates and adjudicators; does not expressly mention third-party funders
- → **Concerns**: Unclear whether the article sufficiently reigns in *ex parte* communication with candidates; text fails to specifically mention third-party funders, communication with which is particularly problematic

Means of Implementation and Enforcement

Implementation of the Code of Conduct

The Secretariat proposes 3 means of implementation that are not mutually exclusive

Incorporation in a treaty	Integration into disputing parties' agreement	Implementation in other rules
 Incorporation in new multilateral treaty - ensures binding character and coherent application Incorporation in existing IIAs - ensures binding character but lacks coherence and requires piecemeal treaty reform 	 Requires consent of disputing parties; subject to negotiation - difficult to attain in litigious context Does not guarantee coherent application 	 E.g.: procedural rules of arbitral institutions, disclosure forms, court rules and regulations of a future MIC Except for MIC – no coherent or binding application in all investment disputes
Requires individual negotiations	Piecemeal, depends on consent	Piecemeal, depends on consent

→ Code alone will do little; its effectiveness depends on the means of implementation

Means of Implementation and Enforcement

Enforcement of the Code of Conduct

The Secretariat also addresses possible means of enforcement in its Note:

- Proposal remains vague; simply recalls that States have called for sanctions in the Code to be "sufficiently strict to have a deterrent effect."
- **Apply existing sanctions** in procedural rules, e.g., challenge of adjudicators
- Supplement with additional sanctions, such as reduced remuneration or disciplinary measures

Key concerns

- → Without strong enforcement, Code is little different from existing standards (e.g., IBA Guidelines)
- → Legal link between the Code and sanctions in existing procedural rules remains unclear
- → Unclear how supplementary sanctions would be achieved

The Code of Conduct as Part of ISDS reform

Recap

Opportunities Concerns Possibility to address problematic Success depends on means of implementation and adjudicator conduct, including double enforcement, which remain unclear hatting, ex parte communication, and Disclosure obligation insufficient to address double hatting conflicts of interest Ex parte communication at pre-constitution phase not Subject to broad implementation and sufficiently regulated strong enforcement, could harmonize Broad confidentiality provision thwarts efforts for greater existing voluntary standards & ensure transparency greater coherence **Distraction? - Contributes little to overarching ISDS reform,** particularly pressing concerns incl. damages, costs, counterclaims, domestic remedies etc.

